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ARE TWO MINORITIES EQUAL TO ONE?:  
MINORITY COALITION GROUPS AND SECTION 2 
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
Kevin Sette* 
 
Following Jim Crow, vote dilution is the second-generation barrier 
standing between minority voters and the polls.  Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) protects racial and language minorities from these 
vote dilution practices.  To sustain a section 2 claim, a protected “class of 
citizens” must satisfy the criteria laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Thornburg v. Gingles.  First, the class must constitute the majority of a 
hypothetical single-member voting district.  Second, the class must be 
politically cohesive.  Third, the minority class’s preferred candidate must be 
defeated by a white majority voting bloc. 
What the Supreme Court has yet to answer is whether members of more 
than one minority group may form a single “class” to sustain a claim under 
Gingles and the VRA.  In the Court’s silence, the federal circuits have 
diverged on the answer to this question.  This Note examines the developing 
circuit split and proposes that the Supreme Court recognize protection of 
minority coalitions under the VRA.  Principles of statutory interpretation 
require prudent courts to recognize that minority aggregation is 
contemplated by section 2.  Further, the existing Gingles framework is 
readily equipped to prevent noncohesive groups from abusing section 2 for 
unfair political advantage. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider Marques County, a fictional county located in a state consisting 
of both urban and suburban areas.1  There are three single-member voting 
districts2 within Marques County—District 1, District 2, and District 3.  All 
three districts, prior to 2010 and now, are roughly equal in population size. 
Before 2010, Marques County’s only urban region fell entirely within 
District 1.  Most of the county’s minority population resides in this urban 
area.  The voting population of District 1 was, prior to 2010, 49 percent 
Hispanic or Black and 45 percent white.  Districts 2 and 3 are entirely 
suburban and predominantly white.  Elections in Marques County are 
 
 1. This hypothetical, using facts similar to those of real cases, serves as an example of 
vote dilution in a single-member voting district involving multiple minority groups. 
 2. A single-member voting district is one in which the electorate of each district elects 
only one candidate. Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1384 n.4 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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typically voted along racial lines, with Hispanics and Blacks consistently 
voting for the same candidates.  As a result, a minority-preferred candidate 
has historically represented District 1, and white-preferred candidates have 
historically represented Districts 2 and 3. 
Following the 2010 Census, the state legislature redrew its voting districts, 
including those in Marques County.  The three districts were redrawn so that 
Marques County’s urban region is now divided equally among Districts 1, 2, 
and 3.  The result is a redistribution of racial and ethnic diversity within each 
district.  Whereas the combined population of Hispanics and Blacks once 
constituted a predominant majority in District 1, each of Marques County’s 
three single-member voting districts now has a white majority.  Since 
redistricting took place, no minority-preferred candidate has won an election 
in Marques County. 
Hispanic and Black plaintiffs file a complaint in federal court claiming that 
their votes in Marques County are being diluted in violation of the federal 
Voting Rights Act of 19653 (VRA).4  Vote dilution is a process by which an 
electoral system “diminish[es] the overall impact of the minority vote.”5  
Since 1965, the VRA has banned vote dilution of racial minorities and, 
following an amendment in 1975, has done the same for language 
minorities.6  The plaintiffs argue that the legislature diluted the power of their 
votes because, despite no change in the actual population of Marques County, 
redistricting has eliminated their ability to elect legislators of their choice. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the VRA in Thornburg v. 
Gingles7 established three criteria that a protected “class of citizens”8 must 
show to successfully sustain a claim of vote dilution.9  First, the minority 
group must be sufficiently large and compact to constitute the majority of a 
theoretical single-member voting district.10  Second, the minority group must 
be politically cohesive.11  Third, the white majority must vote as a bloc to 
defeat minority-preferred candidates.12  The Supreme Court, however, has 
failed to identify whether a “class of citizens” protected under the VRA may 
 
 3. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and 
52 U.S.C.).  
 4. This hypothetical action is the first procedural step for real-life litigants pursuing a 
vote dilution claim under the VRA on a minority coalition theory. 
 5. Allan J. Lichtman & J. Gerald Herbert, A General Theory of Vote Dilution, 6 LA RAZA 
L.J. 1, 4 (1993). 
 6. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018); Rick G. Strange, Application of Voting Rights Act 
to Communities Containing Two or More Minority Groups—When Is the Whole Greater Than 
the Sum of the Parts?, 20 TEX. TECH L. REV. 95, 104 (1989) (“[S]ection 2 provides that 
minority votes are not to be diluted by any voting scheme or structure.”); About Section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-
rights-act [https://perma.cc/Q3HC-WR3G] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020); see also infra notes 
64–65 and accompanying text (defining “language minorities” under the VRA). 
 7. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 8. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). 
 9. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50–51. 
 10. Id. at 50. 
 11. Id. at 51. 
 12. Id. 
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contain members of more than one minority group.13  Stated differently, may 
the Hispanic and Black plaintiffs of Marques County aggregate14 to bring a 
unified claim of vote dilution or must they sustain claims as two different 
classes? 
Federal circuit courts have diverged on the answer to this question for 
years.15  Initially, the federal circuits unanimously accepted the notion that 
multiple minority groups may create a single class under the VRA.16  In 
Campos v. City of Baytown,17 for example, the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
nothing in the text or history of the VRA prevented Blacks and Hispanics 
from alleging a single vote dilution claim together.18  Almost ten years later, 
the Sixth Circuit became the first to take the opposite position.19  In Nixon v. 
Kent County,20 a divided Sixth Circuit concluded en banc that the VRA’s text 
did not support a finding that aggregated minority groups were a protected 
class.21  Following Nixon, a split developed in the circuit courts, which has 
gone unaddressed by the Supreme Court and Congress for over three 
decades.22 
Scholars have taken up the challenge and are similarly at odds.23  Critics 
of minority aggregation contend that the VRA was not intended to protect 
 
 13. See Lauren R. Weinberg, Note, Reading the Tea Leaves:  The Supreme Court and the 
Future of Coalition Districts Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 
411, 413 (2013) (noting that the Supreme Court has never addressed the minority aggregation 
issue directly); see also Audrey Yang, Note, Treading Carefully After Shelby County:  
Minority Coalitions Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 701, 702 
(explaining that federal circuits are split on Congress’s intent regarding minority aggregation). 
 14. The phrases “minority coalition” and “minority aggregation” are used interchangeably 
throughout this Note.  The general idea is “the ability to join our votes with like-minded others 
to elect our preferred candidates.” See Daniel P. Tokaji, Vote Dissociation, 127 YALE L.J. 
FORUM 761, 764 (2018); see also Michael S. Taintor, Note, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 
Special Circumstances, and Evidence of Equality, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1767, 1775 (2019). 
 15. Compare League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4386 v. Midland Indep. 
Sch. Dist. (LULAC I), 812 F.2d 1494, 1500–02 (5th Cir. 1987) (accepting minority coalition 
claims), reh’g granted, 818 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1987), and vacated, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 
1987), and Concerned Citizens of Hardee Cty. v. Hardee Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F.2d 524, 
526 (11th Cir. 1990) (same), and Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation v. City of 
Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1994) (same), with Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 
1388 (6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting coalition claims as beyond the VRA’s scope). 
 16. In 1996, the Sixth Circuit was the first court to reject minority aggregation at the 
federal appellate level. See Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1388.  At that point, other circuits had 
contemplated and accepted aggregation for at least nine years. See supra note 15. 
 17. 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 18. Id. at 1244. 
 19. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 20. 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 21. Id. at 1388. 
 22. See infra Part II (outlining the circuit split that has developed across the federal circuit 
courts that have addressed the coalition claim question). 
 23. Compare Dale E. Ho, Two Fs for Formalism:  Interpreting Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act in Light of Changing Demographics and Electoral Patterns, 50 HARV. C. R.-C. L. 
L. REV. 403 (2015), and Sara Michaloski, Note, A Tale of Two Minority Groups:  Can Two 
Different Minority Groups Bring a Coalition Suit Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 271 (2014), with Sebastian Geraci, Note, The Case Against 
Allowing Multiracial Coalitions to File Section 2 Dilution Claims, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 389, 
Christopher E. Skinnell, Note, Why Courts Should Forbid Minority Coalition Plaintiffs Under 
2020] ARE TWO MINORITIES EQUAL TO ONE? 2697 
political groups.24  They argue that, by congregating, the minority plaintiffs 
in Marques County would be abusing VRA protections to further mutual 
political interests.25  Critics assert that multiple minority groups together 
could not constitute a single “class of citizens” protected in the VRA’s text.26  
In contrast, supporters of coalition groups argue that the VRA should be 
interpreted broadly to provide the greatest degree of protection possible.27  
Such supporters affirmatively dispute the contention that coalition groups 
would be able to abuse VRA protection for political gain.28  Like claims 
asserted by a single minority group, claims by multiple minorities would still 
have to satisfy the burdens established in Gingles.29  As such, the Marques 
County plaintiffs would still have to prove, at a minimum, that they constitute 
the majority of a potential district (for example, District 1 prior to 2010), 
cohesively vote for the same candidates, and their candidate was defeated by 
a white voting bloc.30 
A lack of clarity about minority coalition rights creates practical concerns.  
America’s white population is declining as Hispanic, Black, and Asian 
populations rise in certain regions of the country.31  Between 2000 and 2018, 
over one hundred counties witnessed white populations drop below 50 
percent of the total population in each county.32  Almost three hundred 
counties total “were majority nonwhite in 2018,”33 including twenty-one of 
the nation’s twenty-five most populous counties.34  Translated to the voting 
context, nonwhites will represent a record one-third of all eligible voters in 
 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Absent Clear Congressional Authorization, 2002 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 363, and Yang, supra note 13. 
 24. See Geraci, supra note 23, at 393 (“The VRA was not designed to cater to interest-
group politics.”); Skinnell, supra note 23, at 365 (“[A]ggregation would be a radical departure 
from the VRA’s purpose of ending racial discrimination, making it a mere tool of political 
interests.”).  Drawing this distinction will be all the more important now that the Supreme 
Court has decided that partisan gerrymandering claims pose a political question beyond the 
reach of federal courts. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019). 
 25. See Geraci, supra note 23, at 393 (arguing that the VRA’s purpose was to end 
discrimination and not to give coalition groups power they otherwise would not have). 
 26. See, e.g., Yang, supra note 13, at 716 (contending that use of the singular “class” in 
the VRA’s text prevents inclusion of multiminority coalitions). 
 27. See Ho, supra note 23, at 431–32 n.167; Michaloski, supra note 23, at 293. 
 28. See Michaloski, supra note 23, at 294. 
 29. See id.; see also supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
 30. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
 31. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Reflecting a Demographic Shift, 109 U.S. Counties Have 
Become Majority Nonwhite Since 2000, PEW RES. CTR.:  FACT TANK (Aug. 21, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/21/u-s-counties-majority-nonwhite/ 
[https://perma.cc/85B2-3WEN].  For example, in 2018, the Hispanic population in the United 
States reached 59.9 million, an increase of 1.2 million from the previous year. Antonio Flores 
et al., U.S. Hispanic Population Reached New High in 2018, but Growth Has Slowed, PEW 
RES. CTR.:  FACT TANK (July 8, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/08/u-
s-hispanic-population-reached-new-high-in-2018-but-growth-has-slowed/ [https://perma.cc/ 
75YH-H29G]. 
 32. Krogstad, supra note 31. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. (“In 21 of the 25 biggest U.S. counties by population, nonwhite groups together 
make up more than half of residents.”). 
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the 2020 presidential election.35  As a result of these trends, the impending 
2020 Census will task state legislatures with redrawing voting districts 
around an unprecedented number of nonwhite municipalities.  The likely 
aftermath will be a wave of litigation by minority groups, both individually 
and in the aggregate, alleging dilution of their voting rights—especially in 
regions already accused of engaging in minority voter suppression.36  To 
properly address these claims, there must be uniformity in how courts 
interpret the legal responsibilities imposed on state legislatures regarding 
minority coalition voting. 
This Note addresses the current ambiguity surrounding the legal rights of 
minority coalitions.  The majority37 circuit court approach permits minority 
coalitions to bring vote dilution claims, relying on congressional intent and 
broad statutory interpretation for support.38  This includes a handful of 
circuits that accept minority aggregation without even addressing the issue.39  
The minority40 circuit court approach interprets the VRA narrowly to require 
that a single “class of citizens” be composed of members of a single minority 
group.41  Scholars tried to resolve this disagreement but have provided 
meritorious arguments on both sides.42  The circuit split ultimately leaves 
state legislatures uncertain about their legal obligations and gives minority 
groups varying degrees of protection depending on where in the country their 
rights are being violated. 
 
 35. Anthony Cilluffo & Richard Fry, An Early Look at the 2020 Electorate, PEW RES. 
CTR.:  SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/ 
essay/an-early-look-at-the-2020-electorate/ [https://perma.cc/Y3DF-MMDK]. 
 36. See Jason Lemon, Hours-Long Super Tuesday Voting Lines in Texas County Lead to 
Accusations of ‘Voter Suppression,’ NEWSWEEK (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/ 
hours-long-super-tuesday-voting-lines-texas-county-lead-accusations-voter-suppression-
1490560 [https://perma.cc/ZN98-7HCR]; Wendy R. Weiser, This Is the Worst Voter 
Suppression We’ve Seen in the Modern Era, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 2, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/worst-voter-suppression-weve-
seen-modern-era [https://perma.cc/EAU2-Z3XN] (“There’s evidence that states in which the 
political clout of minorities is growing—where the ruling majority perceives a threat to its 
power—are more likely to see restrictive voting laws than are more demographically 
homogenous states.  And as the salience of race in our politics has increased, so too has voter 
suppression.”).  These fears have only been exacerbated by the effects of the coronavirus 
pandemic on voting. See Alex Isenstadt, Trump Campaign Declares War on Dems Over 
Voting Rules for November, POLITICO (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/ 
2020/04/03/trump-2020-election-legal-battle-coronavirus-162152 [https://perma.cc/QQ8S-
4TRD] (citing the surge in voting-related litigation likely to commence following elections 
impacted by the pandemic). 
 37. See Yang, supra note 13, at 702 (identifying permission of minority aggregation as 
the majority view among the circuits). 
 38. See infra Part II.A (identifying courts of appeals that have explicitly assented to 
coalition claims). 
 39. See infra Part II.B (identifying courts of appeals that have implicitly assented to 
coalition claims). 
 40. See Yang, supra note 13, at 702. 
 41. See infra Part II.C (identifying courts of appeals that have rejected coalition claims). 
 42. See infra Parts II.A.3, II.C.3 (identifying, respectively, scholarly support for and 
criticism of minority aggregation under the VRA). 
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Part I of this Note provides background information on the enactment and 
development of the VRA, as well as a general history of minority voting 
rights in the United States.  This Note reviews seminal Supreme Court cases 
that interpret, expand, and limit the VRA’s powers and applicability. 
Part II analyzes the current split among both the federal courts of appeals 
and scholars over whether the VRA permits aggregated minority groups to 
sustain vote dilution claims.  This Note divides the federal circuits into three 
distinct groups:  (1) those that have explicitly granted VRA protections to 
minority coalitions, (2) those that have assumed the validity of such 
protections, and (3) those that have explicitly denied or are likely to deny 
extension of the VRA to aggregated minority claims. 
Part III argues that both the VRA’s text and Congress’s intent support 
allowing minority coalition claims.  This Note asserts that applying common 
tools of statutory interpretation to the VRA requires prudent courts to 
recognize that members of different minority groups can form a single “class 
of citizens.”  Finally, this Note concludes by disputing common criticisms of 
minority aggregation, including the popular belief that coalitions will abuse 
the VRA for unfair political advantage. 
I.  THE VRA AND MINORITY VOTING POWER 
A.  History of the VRA 
The tempestuous journey of recognizing minority voting rights in the 
United States started with the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 
1870.43  The Fifteenth Amendment declares that the right to vote may not be 
“denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”44  In its aftermath, measures were taken across the country to 
resist this constitutional constraint and circumvent minority access to the 
franchise.45  The Supreme Court seemed to have constructively rendered the 
Fifteenth Amendment moot in 1898 when it upheld one of these measures:  
a Mississippi poll tax designed to deny Blacks the right to vote.46  This 
decision catalyzed enactment of similar legislation across the South.47  These 
 
 43. See Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights:  The Legal Disenfranchisement 
of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 732–33 (1998); see also U.S. CONST. amend. 
XV.  
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 45. See Hench, supra note 43, at 733–36.  At the time, these legal measures included 
“whites-only” primaries, poll taxes, and literacy tests. Id. 
 46. See Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222 (1898) (finding that a Mississippi law 
requiring payment of taxes in order to vote did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  Congress was no better. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One 
v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009) (“The first century of congressional enforcement of the 
[Fifteenth] Amendment . . . can only be regarded as a failure.”). 
 47. A Brief History of Jim Crow, CONST. RTS. FOUND., https://www.crf-usa.org/black-
history-month/a-brief-history-of-jim-crow [https://perma.cc/CKB3-YYJ4] (last visited Apr. 
12, 2020) (“Given the green light, Southern states began to limit the voting right to those who 
owned property or could read well, to those whose grandfathers had been able to vote, to those 
with ‘good characters,’ to those who paid poll taxes.”). 
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“first-generation”48 methods of voter suppression persisted well into the 
twentieth century,49 until Congress and the federal courts eventually phased 
them out.50  States soon thereafter adopted newer and more complex 
“second-generation” methods of disenfranchisement in the form of strategic 
redistricting and vote dilution.51  In response to these evolving practices, 
Congress passed the VRA52 to vigorously reinforce each citizen’s 
constitutional voting rights, “including the right to . . . cast meaningful 
votes.”53  The VRA is not permanent legislation but instead survives by 
Congress’s periodic extension of the law.54  Most recently, the VRA was 
extended in 2006 for a period of twenty-five years.55 
There are two primary provisions of the VRA:  section 2 and section 5.56  
Section 5 prohibits changes in the election practices of certain jurisdictions, 
specifically those having a greater likelihood of promoting voter 
disenfranchisement, until such changes have passed administrative review by 
the attorney general or U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.57  
However, the Supreme Court’s 2013 ruling in Shelby County v. Holder58 
declared unconstitutional section 5’s selection criteria.59  While not found 
unconstitutional itself, section 5 is all but unusable after Shelby County.60 
 
 48. Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
1663, 1671 (2001) (classifying legal remedies to “first-generation” methods, primarily the 
Fifteenth Amendment, as “first-generation” voting rights). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Kelly Phillips Erb, For Election Day, a History of the Poll Tax in America, FORBES 
(Nov. 5, 2018, 8:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2018/11/05/just-
before-the-elections-a-history-of-the-poll-tax-in-america [https://perma.cc/Y9VG-DRTB] 
(describing the systematic rejection of Jim Crow laws, including the poll tax, via the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment, VRA, and Supreme Court precedent). 
 51. See Chelsea J. Hopkins, Note, The Minority Coalition’s Burden of Proof Under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 623, 626 n.18 (2012); see also 
Gerken, supra note 48, at 1666. 
 52. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and 
52 U.S.C.). 
 53. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 note (2018) (stating Congress’s purpose and findings in enacting 
the VRA). 
 54. See History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https:// 
www.justice.gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rights-laws [https://perma.cc/S3B4-W432] (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 55. Carl Hulse, By a Vote of 98-0, Senate Approves 25-Year Extension of Voting Rights 
Act, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/21/washington/ 
21vote.html [https://perma.cc/3PWZ-QM6Y]. 
 56. Hopkins, supra note 51, at 626. 
 57. See 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)–(b); About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 6. 
 58. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 59. Id. at 553–54 (finding that Congress’s renewal of section 5 criteria was 
unconstitutional because “Congress did not . . . shape [an updated] coverage formula 
grounded in current conditions”). 
 60. See About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 6.  The Supreme Court’s 
gutting of section 5 resulted in a wave of discriminatory voting practices. See Kristen Clarke 
& Ezra Rosenberg, Opinion, Trump Administration Has Voting Rights Act on Life Support, 
CNN (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/06/opinions/voting-rights-act-
anniversary-long-way-to-go-clarke-rosenberg-opinion/index.html [https://perma.cc/47DQ-
TD9K] (“After Shelby, a myriad of discriminatory voting practices have been implemented 
both in jurisdictions previously covered by Section 5 and those that were not.”); Anagha 
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Unlike other provisions of the VRA, section 2 applies to all U.S. 
jurisdictions and remains practicably enforceable.61  At its creation, section 
2 banned any state62 “standard, practice, or procedure” that denied or 
abridged a citizen’s right to vote “on account of race or color.”63  Section 2 
was subsequently amended in 1975 to extend these protections to “language 
minority group[s].”64  This amendment specifically protects American 
Indians, Asian Americans, Alaskan Natives, and persons of Spanish 
heritage.65  Section 2 is violated where, based on a totality of the 
circumstances, “members of a [protected] class of citizens” have less 
opportunity to “participate in the political process and elect representatives 
of their choice.”66 
 
Srikanth, Long Voting Lines in Texas Renew Accusations of Voter Suppression, HILL (Mar. 4, 
2020), https://thehill.com/changing-america/respect/diversity-inclusion/485906-long-voting-
lines-in-texas-renew-accusations-of [https://perma.cc/RLJ2-EGEP] (identifying that Texas 
alone has closed 750 polling stations since 2012); Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court May 
Soon Deal a Final, Fatal Blow to the Voting Rights Act, SLATE (Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/10/supreme-court-voting-rights-act-
obliteration.html [https://perma.cc/ZPZ2-4LHB] (stating that, following Shelby County, states 
have closed over 1600 polling places and enacted discriminatory voter ID laws).  In February 
2019, companion legislation was introduced in both houses of Congress, which intended to 
revive section 5 by codifying an updated coverage formula to assign preclearance 
requirements. John Bowden, Dems Introduce Bills to Restore Voting Rights Act Provision, 
HILL (Feb. 26, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/431693-democrats-introduce-bill-
to-strengthen-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/84JU-S72H]. 
 61. Kathay Feng, Keith Aoki & Bryan Ikegmai, Voting Matters:  AIPAs, Latinas/os and 
Post-2000 Redistricting in California, 81 OR. L. REV. 849, 864 (2002).  Recently, however, 
section 2 has been subject to attack on both enforcement and constitutionality grounds. See 
Ala. State Conference of the NAACP v. Alabama, 949 F.3d 647, 659 (11th Cir. 2020) (Branch, 
J., dissenting) (contending that the VRA does not abrogate state sovereign immunity, meaning 
individuals have no right to sue states for section 2 violations); see also Stern, supra note 60 
(identifying arguments that section 2’s “results test,” see infra note 78 and accompanying text, 
is unconstitutional because it exceeds the Fifteenth Amendment’s scope, which only bars 
intentional discrimination). 
 62. The VRA also prohibits discriminatory voting practices by the federal government 
and local governments. See Paige A. Epstein, Addressing Minority Vote Dilution Through 
State Voting Rights Acts 3 (Univ. Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 474, 
2014), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1918&context= 
public_law_and_legal_theory [https://perma.cc/KJM6-QV28]. 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018)). 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1976) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(f)(2) (2018)). 
 65. 52 U.S.C. § 10310(c)(3) (2018). 
 66. Id. § 10301(b).  The full, current version of section 2 reads as follows: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a 
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the 
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the 
guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b). 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or 
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by 
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have 
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice.  The extent to which members 
of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision 
is one circumstance which may be considered:  Provided, That nothing in this 
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B.  Burdens of Proof Under the VRA and Constitution 
Originally, claims brought under the VRA only needed to allege that the 
challenged voting practice resulted in a discriminatory effect.67  However, 
the Supreme Court’s 1980 ruling in Mobile v. Bolden68 called for a 
heightened standard of discriminatory intent.69  The Court, relying on 
Washington v. Davis70 and its progeny, applied the “purposeful 
discrimination” standard that is required to bring a claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth 
Amendment.71  The Court has long required that equal protection claims 
show discriminatory purpose.72  This standard has previously been applied 
in the context of equal protection vote dilution claims.73  Similarly, “racially 
discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth 
Amendment violation.”74  This has produced a line of conflicting Supreme 
Court decisions on Fifteenth Amendment claims75 of allegedly racially 
motivated gerrymandering.76 
In response to Bolden, Congress amended the VRA again in 1982 to make 
it clear that a section 2 claim “could be proved by showing discriminatory 
effect alone.”77  Congress created what is now the current section 2 
framework—a “results test” asking whether, as a result of the challenged 
practice, members of the protected class have comparatively less opportunity 
 
section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers 
equal to their proportion in the population. 
Id. § 10301(a)–(b). 
 67. See Strange, supra note 6, at 100. 
 68. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 69. Id. at 66 (“A plaintiff must prove that the disputed plan was ‘conceived or operated as 
[a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial . . . discrimination.’” (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 
403 U.S. 124, 149–50 (1971))). 
 70. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 71. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 67 (“The Court explicitly indicated in [Davis] that this principle 
applies to claims of racial discrimination affecting voting just as it does to other claims of 
racial discrimination.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 
(1977) (“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause.”); Davis, 426 U.S. at 240. 
 73. See, e.g., Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (requiring a finding that the 
legislature’s redistricting was motivated by racial considerations in order to sustain an equal 
protection claim). 
 74. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62. 
 75. Compare Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346–48 (1960) (identifying that a 
possible Fifteenth Amendment claim was stated where plaintiffs’ alleged municipal boundary 
redistricting was racially motivated gerrymandering), with Wright, 376 U.S. at 58 (denying a 
Fifteenth Amendment claim of racial gerrymandering because plaintiffs failed to show 
discriminatory intent of the legislature). 
 76. Gerrymandering is the “practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, 
often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the 
opposition’s voting strength.” Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 77. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982) 
(current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018)). 
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to elect their representatives of choice.78  The Senate Judiciary Committee 
report accompanying the 1982 amendments identified a noncomprehensive 
list of factors to consider when courts conduct a totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis.79  Each factor is concerned with the practices or effects of the state’s 
election and political processes.80 
The Senate was explicit that intent is an inappropriate measure for 
establishing a section 2 violation.81  First, intent standards ask the wrong 
question.82  If a current practice “operates today to exclude blacks or 
Hispanics from a fair chance to participate,” the past or present motives 
behind the standard are “of the most limited relevance.”83  Second, Congress 
also determined that an intent requirement would be unnecessarily divisive 
because it requires an allegation of racism against the officials or community 
implementing the voting procedure.84  Third, showing intent places an 
“inordinately difficult burden” on plaintiffs to sustain a claim.85  The Bolden 
Court advocated for an intent standard because it argued that section 2 and 
 
 78. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35–36; see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) 
(using the test that Congress codified in the VRA’s 1982 amendment, which asks whether 
members of the protected class “had less opportunity than did other[s] . . . to participate in the 
political processes”). 
 79. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37–38; see also S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982). 
 80. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29.  The factors include the following: 
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political 
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, 
to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is 
racially polarized; 
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large 
election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other 
voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination 
against the minority group; 
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group 
have been denied access to that process; 
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political 
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, 
employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the 
political process; 
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial 
appeals; 
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public 
office in the jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 81. See id. at 36. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. at 36–37 (noting the unique difficulty of determining intent from lackluster 
state or local legislative records of voting practices implemented decades earlier); see also 
Joan F. Hartman, Racial Vote Dilution and Separation of Powers:  An Exploration of the 
Conflict Between the Judicial “Intent” and the Legislative “Results” Standards, 50 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 689, 741 (1982) (“The drafters articulated two distinct aims in amending 
section 2:  to forestall purposeful discrimination that might escape undetected under the 
stringent intent test and to eliminate systems that perpetuate the effects of past 
discrimination.”). 
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the Fifteenth Amendment served congruent purposes.86  However, following 
the expansion of the VRA’s provisions in the two decades following its 
creation, it was no longer legislation coextensive with the Fifteenth 
Amendment.87  Instead, the VRA became an “example of Congress’s power 
to enact implementing legislation that goes beyond the direct prohibitions of 
the Constitution itself.”88 
C.  Evolution of Vote Dilution Claims Under Section 2 
Voter suppression is a process whereby a minority’s right of access to the 
polls is completely barred.89  Dilution of the vote, however, occurs when the 
strength of a group’s voting power is reduced such that the group’s ability to 
elect its preferred candidate is diminished or eliminated.90  Unlike the often-
individualized analysis of voter suppression, dilution requires courts to 
consider the treatment of a group to determine whether an individual has 
suffered harm.91  Vote dilution, as a legal doctrine, developed over time 
through the courts but was codified by the VRA as a private cause of action.92  
There are two strands of vote dilution used in practice:  “cracking” and 
“packing.”93  Cracking is redistricting in a way that disperses minority groups 
among different voting districts so that no single district has enough minority 
voters to impact an election.94  Packing is the alternative practice of crowding 
 
 86. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1980) (“[T]he sparse legislative history of § 2 
makes clear that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth 
Amendment itself.”). 
 87. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 39. 
 88. Id. at 39; see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (finding 
that “Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate [the Fifteenth 
Amendment], so long as the prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in voting are 
appropriate”); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (“As against the 
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the 
constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”). 
 89. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1993) (“[I]t soon became apparent that 
guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not suffice to root out other racially 
discriminatory voting practices. . . . ‘[T]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting 
power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.’” (quoting Allen v. State Bd. 
of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969))). 
 90. Id. at 641; see also Epstein, supra note 62, at 3. 
 91. Gerken, supra note 48, at 1667. 
 92. Id. at 1671.  The VRA originally entitled only the attorney general to enforce the Act. 
See Ala. State Conference of the NAACP v. Alabama, 949 F.3d 647, 652 (11th Cir. 2020).  
However, the Supreme Court first recognized the implicit right of private citizens to enforce 
the VRA in 1969. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 555 (1969) (“Analysis of 
[section 5] in light of the major purpose of the Act indicates that [private citizens] may seek a 
declaratory judgment that a new state enactment is governed by § 5.”).  In 1975, Congress 
amended the VRA to explicitly allow private citizens enforcement rights over the Act as a 
whole. See 52 U.S.C. § 10302(a) (2018); see also Ala. State Conference of the NAACP, 949 
F.3d at 652.  Despite challenges by states under a sovereign immunity theory, the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Eleventh Circuits have upheld Congress’s right to limit the states’ sovereign immunity by 
granting a private cause of action against state violations of the VRA. See Ala. State 
Conference of the NAACP, 949 F.3d at 652; OCA-Greater Hous. v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 614 
(5th Cir. 2017); Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 93. Feng, Aoki & Ikegmai, supra note 61, at 864. 
 94. Id. 
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minority groups into a small handful of districts so that the overall reach of 
the group’s legislative influence is weakened.95 
After two decades of confusion about the requirements needed to sustain 
a section 2 vote dilution claim, the Supreme Court provided some clarity in 
its seminal 1985 case, Thornburg v. Gingles.  In Gingles, Justice William 
Brennan identified three factors (“Gingles factors”) that a plaintiff must 
satisfy to successfully claim that a multimember96 voting district is in 
violation of section 2.97  First, the minority group must demonstrate that it is 
“sufficiently large and geographically compact” to represent the majority in 
a hypothetical single-member voting district.98  Otherwise, the 
“multimember form” of an election system cannot be blamed for the minority 
group’s failure to elect candidates.99  Second, the minority group must show 
that it is “politically cohesive.”100  Third, the minority group must establish 
that the white majority “votes sufficiently as a bloc” to “defeat the minority’s 
preferred candidate.”101  The second and third factors help determine whether 
the degree of racially polarized voting is legally sufficient to sustain a section 
2 claim.102  Finding racially polarized voting requires a fact-specific inquiry 
into whether there is “a consistent relationship between [the] race of the voter 
and the way in which the voter votes.”103  There is no clear doctrinal test, but 
sufficient polarization is stronger when a pattern of racial bloc voting can be 
identified.104  Ultimately, failure to satisfy any one of the Gingles factors will 
defeat a plaintiff’s section 2 claim.105 
In 1993, the Supreme Court in Growe v. Emison106 extended the Gingles 
factor analysis to claims brought against single-member voting districts.107  
 
 95. Id. 
 96. A multimember voting district is one in which two or more representatives are elected 
to represent a single district. Daniel R. Ortiz, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for 
Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 YALE L.J. 144, 145 n.8 (1982). 
 97. Thornberg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49–51 (1986).  This is in contrast to a single-
member voting district, where each voting district elects only one representative. Nixon v. 
Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1384 n.4 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 98. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17 (“[T]he single-member district is generally the 
appropriate standard against which to measure minority group potential to elect because it is 
the smallest political unit from which representatives are elected.”). 
 99. Id. at 48 (“Multimember districts and at-large election schemes . . . are not per se 
violative of minority voters’ rights.”). 
 100. Id. at 51. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. at 56 (“The purpose of inquiring into the existence of racially polarized voting 
is twofold:  to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a politically cohesive unit 
and to determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s 
preferred candidates.”); see also MATT BARRETO ET AL., REDISTRICTING:  COALITION 
DISTRICTS AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1, 3 (2011), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/ 
files/Coalition(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/7FUV-U9AG]. 
 103. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n.21 (quoting the district court record). 
 104. Id. at 57. 
 105. Skinnell, supra note 23, at 368. 
 106. 507 U.S. 25 (1993). 
 107. See generally id.  Multimember voting districts are still those most scrutinized by 
section 2 because they “submerge the votes of a minority in the majority.” See Taintor, supra 
note 14, at 1775–76.  However, single-member voting districts, like those in the fictional 
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The Court determined that the logic behind the factors still applied.108  The 
majority population and political cohesion requirements still work to 
establish that the minority group has the potential to elect its preferred 
candidate.109  The white majority bloc requirement still proves that the 
minority vote is diluted when submerged in a “larger white voting 
population.”110  A year later, in Johnson v. De Grandy,111 the Court added a 
deferential fourth factor to the Gingles analysis in its holding that “the three 
Gingles factors may not be isolated as sufficient, standing alone, to prove 
dilution in every multimember [or single-member] district challenge.”112  
The original three factors provided structure to section 2’s totality-of-the-
circumstances requirement113 but “cannot be applied mechanically and 
without regard to the nature of the claim.”114  Thus, the initial three factors 
are a prerequisite but are not necessarily dispositive.115 
The Supreme Court also determined in Chisom v. Roemer116 that section 
2 protections under the VRA must be liberally construed.117  The Court 
recognized that Congress’s purpose for passing the VRA was “rid[ding] the 
country of racial discrimination in voting.”118  In doing so, Congress passed 
a statute that was “enacted to protect voting rights that are not adequately 
protected by the Constitution itself.”119  As a result, the Court concluded that 
section 2 must be “interpreted in a manner that provides ‘the broadest 
possible scope’ in combatting racial discrimination.”120  The Court 
recognized the difficulties of this broad, fact-specific inquiry but determined 
that such difficulties “cannot justify a judicially created limitation on the 
coverage of the broadly worded statute, as enacted and amended by 
Congress.”121 
D.  Response to Minority Aggregation Claims 
In the aftermath of the Gingles framework, minority groups began 
aggregating to satisfy, primarily, the first Gingles factor:  the majority-
 
Marques County, “can achieve the same result if none of the districts provide actual electoral 
opportunity to people of color [and language minorities].” See id. at 1776. 
 108. Emison, 507 U.S. at 40. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. 512 U.S. 997 (1994). 
 112. Id. at 1012. 
 113. Id. at 1010. 
 114. Id. at 1007 (quoting Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158 (1993)). 
 115. Id. at 1012. 
 116. 501 U.S. 380 (1991). 
 117. See id. at 403 (holding that state judicial elections fell within the scope of section 2 of 
the VRA). 
 118. Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969)). 
 121. Id. 
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minority population requirement.122  A minority coalition group exists where 
more than one ethnic or language minority (for example, Blacks and 
Hispanics) combine to form a numerical majority of the eligible voting 
population.123  Congress made no explicit reference to minority coalitions in 
the text of the VRA, though Congress considered at least one 
constitutional124 coalition case in drafting its subsequent amendments to 
section 2.125  The Supreme Court has referenced coalition groups,126 though 
it has never explicitly decided whether they can sustain a valid claim under 
section 2.127 
In Emison, the Court conducted its review of a ruling from the District of 
Minnesota assuming, without explicitly holding, that the district court was 
allowed to aggregate more than one distinct minority group.128  In making 
this assumption, the Supreme Court determined that the presence of a 
coalition group made “proof of minority political cohesion . . . all the more 
 
 122. See Skinnell, supra note 23, at 369; see also Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 149 
(1993) (defining a majority-minority district as one “in which a majority of the [voting] 
population is a member of a specific minority group”). 
 123. See Skinnell, supra note 23, at 363.  These are different from “crossover” groups, 
where a protected minority constitutes a numerical majority of the electorate only when 
combined with members of the white majority who vote for the minority’s preferred candidate. 
Epstein, supra note 62, at 5.  The Supreme Court has explicitly refused to extend section 2 
protections to crossover voting districts. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25–26 (2009) 
(plurality opinion). 
 124. Both courts and scholars have recognized that, in contemplating whether the 1975 
VRA amendments should include language minorities, the Senate also cited to at least one 
section 2 minority coalition claim. See, e.g., Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1395 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (Keith, J., dissenting) (“In its discussion of the history of discrimination . . . the 
Senate cited at least one case in which African-Americans and Hispanics brought a joint claim 
under the voting rights act.”); Skinnell, supra note 23, at 365 n.18 (identifying the case 
referenced by the Senate as Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964)); see also Michaloski, 
supra note 23, at 278 (“In [Wright], two minority groups brought a joint claim . . . [under] 
Section 2 of the Act.”).  Scholars have been wrong, nevertheless, to characterize Wright as a 
section 2 claim; the plaintiffs, still a minority coalition, pleaded their claims solely as 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment violations. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 53 
(1964). 
 125. S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 27 (1975) (discussing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), 
where an at-large voting system in Texas was found to have unconstitutionally diluted the 
votes of Hispanic and Black voters); Michaloski, supra note 23, at 279. 
 126. See, e.g., Strickland, 556 U.S. at 13 (identifying the difference between coalition 
minority groups and crossover minority groups); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 (1993). 
 127. See Emison, 507 U.S. at 41 (stating that the Court was explicitly not deciding the 
minority coalition question).  Nonetheless, minority coalition claims of vote dilution are 
permissible when brought as constitutional violations. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 
755, 769–70 (1973) (finding that an election scheme diluted the votes of Blacks and Hispanics 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Wright, 376 U.S. at 57–58 (hearing claims of vote 
dilution brought by Blacks and Puerto Ricans as both Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment 
claims); see also Michaloski, supra note 23, at 278 n.41. 
 128. Emison, 507 U.S. at 41. 
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essential.”129  However, the Court was explicit that it would not decide the 
validity of coalition claims under section 2 in this case.130 
In two subsequent opinions, the Court again made reference to minority 
coalitions.131  While the Court noted in Bartlett v. Strickland132 that 
“[n]othing in § 2 grants special protection to a minority group’s right to form 
political coalitions,” this dicta was in reference to a minority group’s attempt 
to form a crossover district, not a coalition district.133  In Perry v. Perez,134 
the Court suggested that requiring a state to create coalition districts in 
compliance with section 5 of the VRA was beyond the scope of what the 
statute requires.135  However, Perez should not conflate the mandated 
creation of new coalition districts under section 5 with the legal protections 
granted to existing coalition districts under section 2.136  Thus, neither 
decision has squarely resolved the minority aggregation question.137 
There are substantial legal and practical differences between crossover 
claims and coalition claims.138  Both exist where a single minority group does 
not constitute a numerical majority “but still could be described as exercising 
functional control over the district’s electoral outcome.”139  However, unlike 
minority coalitions, crossover groups exist where a minority group can 
sustain a functional majority only when combined with white voters who 
support the same candidates.140  The Supreme Court rejected crossover 
claims in Strickland because section 2 “requires a showing that minorities 
‘have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to’” participate 
 
 129. Id. (dismissing the section 2 claim for failure to establish political cohesion). 
 130. Id.; see also Note, The Ties That Bind:  Coalitions and Governance Under Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2621, 2629 (2004) (“[Emison] thus illustrates the 
Court’s ambiguous and cautious approval of a coalitional claim under section 2.”). 
 131. Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 398–99 (2012); Strickland, 556 U.S. at 13. 
 132. 556 U.S. 1 (2009). 
 133. Id. at 13–15 (stating explicitly that the Court was not addressing “coalition-district 
claims in which two minority groups form a coalition to elect the candidate of the coalition’s 
choice”); see also Weinberg, supra note 13, at 426. 
 134. 565 U.S. 388 (2012). 
 135. See id. at 398–99; see also Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 149 (D.D.C. 
2012) (interpreting Perez to mean that section 5 does not require the formation of new 
coalition districts, while also determining that section 5 protects preexisting coalition 
districts).  Back in 2003, the Supreme Court ruled in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) 
that states creating a mixture of majority-minority voting districts and coalition voting 
districts—rather than maximizing majority-minority districts—was not a retrogressive 
violation of section 5. Id. at 483, 487 (“Section 5 leaves room for States to use . . . coalition 
districts.”); see also Note, supra note 130, at 2630–32. 
 136. See Texas, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 149; see also Ho, supra note 23, at 429 (“This [statement 
in Perez] could be based on the assumption that coalition claims are not cognizable under any 
circumstances (which would be an unusual way to announce a new holding on a question that 
only recently had been expressly reserved [in Strickland]).”).  At least with regards to the 
question of retrogression, the Supreme Court has been explicit that it will “refuse to equate a 
§ 2 vote dilution inquiry with the § 5 . . . standard.” Georgia, 539 U.S. at 478–79 (rejecting 
Georgia’s attempt to rely on section 2 precedent to establish its compliance under section 5). 
 137. See Weinberg, supra note 13, at 430. 
 138. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 139. Ho, supra note 23, at 428. 
 140. See id. 
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in the political process.141  Allowing crossover groups to bring claims under 
the VRA would require the Court to change or entirely eliminate the Gingles 
framework that has driven vote dilution analysis since 1985.142  Conditioning 
minority voting power on an alliance with white voters eliminates the 
workability of the first Gingles factor—whether the minority group can 
sustain a majority on its own.143  Additionally, regarding the third Gingles 
factor, “[i]t is difficult to see how the majority-bloc-voting requirement could 
be met in a district where, by definition, white voters join . . . to elect the 
minority’s preferred candidate.”144  Ultimately, the Court refused to require 
the white-minority cooperation that the VRA intended to foster 
voluntarily.145 
Given that the Supreme Court has, at least twice now, reserved judgment 
on the minority coalition question, the circuit courts are split on whether 
multiple minority groups may aggregate to sustain a claim under section 2. 
II.  MINORITY COALITIONS:  A SPLIT IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS 
For more than twenty years, circuit courts have grappled with plaintiffs 
asserting VRA claims on behalf of minority coalitions.  In that time, the 
circuits have interpreted section 2’s applicability to aggregated minority 
groups in three ways:  explicit acceptance, assumed validity, and explicit or 
anticipated rejection.146  In 1987, the Fifth Circuit, in League of United Latin 
American Citizens, Council No. 4386 v. Midland Independent School 
District147 (LULAC I), was the first to explicitly accept minority 
aggregation.148  In 1996, the Sixth Circuit, in Nixon, was the first to explicitly 
reject a coalition group’s right to pursue a section 2 claim.149  The Nixon 
court openly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s analysis and acknowledged that it 
had created a split among the circuits.150  In the time between, and following, 
these decisions, several other circuits weighed in on the aggregation 
question.151  Specifically, the Second and Ninth Circuits accepted review of 
 
 141. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 14 (2009) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)). 
 142. Id. at 16 (“Allowing crossover-district claims would require us to revise and 
reformulate the Gingles threshold inquiry that has been the baseline of our § 2 
jurisprudence.”). 
 143. Id. at 15, 26 (“Only when a geographically compact group of minority voters could 
form a majority in a single-member district has the first Gingles requirement been met.”). 
 144. Id. at 16. 
 145. Id. at 25–26. 
 146. See Skinnell, supra note 23, at 369–73. 
 147. 812 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1987), reh’g granted, 818 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1987), and 
vacated, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 148. See generally id.  It proceeded to do so at least four times. See, e.g., League of United 
Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements (LULAC II), 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993); 
Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 149. Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1388 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 150. Id. (rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s findings while noting that it does “not take lightly 
disagreement with the views of [its] sister circuits”). 
 151. Compare Concerned Citizens of Hardee Cty. v. Hardee Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 
F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1990) (permitting coalition groups), with Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421 
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such claims without explicitly addressing the aggregation issue at all.152  
Several other circuits have not ruled on the issue, while also expressing 
concern about the concept.153  To date, neither the Supreme Court nor 
Congress has provided any clarity regarding the fate of minority coalitions. 
A.  Explicit Acceptance of Minority Aggregation 
Two circuit courts have explicitly determined that minority coalition 
claims permissibly fall within the scope of section 2.154  In 1987, the Fifth 
Circuit ruled in LULAC I that Blacks and Hispanics could aggregate to satisfy 
the Gingles factors.155  The Fifth Circuit upheld this interpretation in 1988, 
twice in 1989, and again in 1993.156  In this time period, the Eleventh Circuit 
addressed the issue in its 1990 ruling in Concerned Citizens of Hardee 
County v. Hardee County Board of Commissioners157 that two minority 
groups may aggregate so long as they are politically cohesive.158  
Additionally, Judge Damon J. Keith’s dissent in Nixon offers the most 
comprehensive judicial analysis to date justifying minority aggregation.159  
Some scholars have weighed in, arguing that permitting coalition claims 
furthers the VRA’s purpose and makes sense in light of the developing 
complexity of American diversity.160 
1.  The Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Precedents 
In LULAC I, Blacks and Hispanics brought a united section 2 claim 
alleging that an at-large voting scheme to elect a school board diluted their 
votes.161  The Western District of Texas agreed and required that the structure 
be divided into single-member voting districts.162  The ruling was appealed 
and subsequently remanded with direction to consider the then newly 
established Gingles factors.163  On remand, the district court again found that 
 
(4th Cir. 2004) (implying rejection of minority aggregation), and Metts v. Murphy, 347 F.3d 
346, 359 (1st Cir. 2003) (same), vacated on reh’g en banc, 363 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).  
 152. See, e.g., Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 280 
(2d Cir. 1994); Badillo v. City of Stockton, 956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 153. See infra Part II.C.2 (identifying federal courts of appeals that have indirectly 
expressed skepticism of minority coalition claims). 
 154. Following a Second Circuit opinion in 2012, three federal circuits arguably have 
explicitly accepted minority aggregation under the VRA. See infra notes 267–70 and 
accompanying text. 
 155. LULAC I, 812 F.2d 1494, 1499–502 (5th Cir. 1987), reh’g granted, 818 F.2d 350 (5th 
Cir. 1987), and vacated, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 156. See generally LULAC II, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993); Brewer v. Ham, 876 F.2d 448 
(5th Cir. 1989); Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1989); Campos v. City of 
Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 157. 906 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 158. See id. at 526. 
 159. See Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1393 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
 160. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 161. See LULAC I, 812 F.2d 1494, 1495 (5th Cir. 1987), reh’g granted, 818 F.2d 350 (5th 
Cir. 1987), and vacated, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. at 1496. 
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both minority groups were subject to a history of “oppressive discrimination” 
and that such discrimination impacted their right to vote and participate in 
the electoral process.164  It determined this by considering the seven Senate 
report factors identified by the Gingles Court as relevant to the totality-of-
the-circumstances review required under section 2.165  The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed.166  In doing so, both the Fifth Circuit and Western District of Texas 
were unconcerned that two different minority groups were implicated.167 
To reach its decision, the Fifth Circuit applied the three prerequisite 
Gingles factors.168  To satisfy the first factor—constituting a majority 
population in a theoretical single-member district—the court accepted the 
trial judge’s finding that “Blacks and Hispanics live predominately in a 
geographically discrete area.”169  The court identified three voting precincts 
that comprised over 90 percent of the district’s Black population and over 70 
percent of the Hispanic population.170  One of these precincts had a 
population that was roughly 45 percent Black and 25 percent Hispanic, for a 
total minority population of roughly 70 percent.171  This “overwhelm[ing]” 
minority presence was sufficient to establish “a geographically compact 
group capable of carrying a district.”172  The court then separated the second 
political cohesion factor into two subquestions:  (1) whether each minority 
group was individually cohesive and (2) whether the two groups were 
cohesive together.173  Both questions were answered affirmatively.174  It 
ultimately did not matter that “there [were] many cultural and ethnic 
differences between the two groups” because the “prejudice of the majority 
is not narrowly focused.”175  Instead, it mattered that both groups had an 
undeniable history of discrimination by the white majority and common 
goals stemming from that history.176  It was also critical that the plaintiffs 
introduced the same statistical methods used in Gingles to show that school 
board elections followed racial lines.177  Finally, the court briefly concluded 
 
 164. See id. (quoting League of United Am. Citizens, Council No. 4836 v. Midland Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 648 F. Supp. 596, 600 (W.D. Tex. 1986)). 
 165. See id. at 1497–98; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 166. See LULAC I, 812 F.2d at 1496. 
 167. See id. at 1498 (“Although there are two minority groups in Midland, both have 
suffered the same adverse social and economic effects Justice Brennan described in discussing 
the black minority in Gingles.”). 
 168. See id. at 1499–502. 
 169. See id. at 1500. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. at 1500–02. 
 175. See id. at 1500. 
 176. See id. at 1500–01 (“The bringing of this lawsuit by Blacks and Hispanics is symbolic 
of their realization that . . . they have common social, economic, and political interests which 
converge and make them a cohesive political group.”). 
 177. See id. at 1501. 
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that the third Gingles factor is satisfied if whites “will usually defeat a 
minority candidate,” whether Black or Hispanic.178 
The Fifth Circuit revisited the minority aggregation question a year later 
in Campos.  The Fifth Circuit upheld the Southern District of Texas’s finding 
of vote dilution of “the politically cohesive combination of Blacks and 
Mexican-Americans.”179  More succinctly stated than in its predecessor case, 
the court found that “nothing in the law . . . prevents the plaintiffs from 
identifying the protected aggrieved minority to include both Blacks and 
Hispanics.”180  It supported this determination by looking to Congress’s 
recognition of the prevalent discrimination of language minorities.181  The 
court concluded that, if members of both minorities are concentrated 
geographically so as to represent the majority of a single-member district, 
they are eligible for the Gingles analysis.182  To establish dilution, a coalition 
must prove that they “actually vote together” and, under the totality of the 
circumstances, are impeded from electing candidates of their choice.183 
While the Campos court engages in a Gingles analysis like that in LULAC 
I, some key additions and deviations are notable.  Regarding the first factor, 
the court rejected the defendant’s argument that, because a significant 
percentage of minorities lived outside the disputed district, the coalition 
failed to establish geographical compactness.184  Judge Thomas M. Reavley 
clarified that the presence of a majority of minorities outside the disputed 
district was insignificant.185  What mattered was that the minorities within 
the disputed district constituted a majority of that district.186  Regarding the 
second factor, Judge Reavley recognized that the dual purpose of identifying 
racially polarized voting in Gingles made it clear that “a minority group is 
politically cohesive if it votes together.”187  The Fifth Circuit’s most notable 
deviation from LULAC I was its finding that a showing of political cohesion 
for each minority group individually was “too great [of,] if not impossible,” 
a burden.188  Like in Gingles, the political cohesion of the coalition group as 
 
 178. See id. at 1502 (finding the third Gingles factor satisfied based on the relatively low 
success of minority candidates in Midland, Texas). 
 179. See Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1241 (5th Cir. 1988).  The court 
ultimately vacated and remanded, finding that the city’s proposed remedial voting plan was 
insufficient. Id. 
 180. See id. at 1244. 
 181. See id. (“Congress itself recognized ‘that voting discrimination against citizens of 
language minorities is pervasive and national in scope.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1))). 
 182. See id. 
 183. Id.  The white bloc majority voting to defeat the coalition remained a necessary factor. 
Id. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See id.; see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.  Judge Reavley was critical 
of the Gingles plurality’s determination that the minority candidate’s race was unimportant. 
See Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245 (finding no clear error in the district court’s decision to focus 
solely “on those [voting] races that had a minority member as a candidate”). 
 188. Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245; see also Strange, supra note 6, at 129 n.219. 
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a whole is sufficient.189  Finally, despite being decided six years before 
Johnson v. De Grandy, Judge Reavley applied the “fourth factor” of the 
Gingles analysis—an additional totality-of-the-circumstances review.190  In 
doing so, he partly relied on the finding that “Blacks and Hispanics suffer the 
lingering socio-economic effects of past official discrimination.”191 
LULAC I and its progeny have clearly recognized minority aggregation as 
a guarantee in the Fifth Circuit.  In Overton v. City of Austin,192 the court 
rejected a section 2 claim because Blacks and Mexican Americans could not 
prove cohesiveness together, though doing so would have permitted their 
claim to go forward.193  The Fifth Circuit reiterated in Brewer v. Ham194 that 
“minority groups may be aggregated for the purposes of asserting a Section 
2 violation” and remarked on the difficulties in proving political cohesion.195  
In League of United American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements196 
(LULAC II), the Fifth Circuit once again proclaimed that “[i]f blacks and 
Hispanics vote cohesively, they are legally a single minority group” for the 
purposes of a section 2 claim.197 
The Eleventh Circuit also reached the same conclusion.  In Concerned 
Citizens of Hardee County, the Eleventh Circuit, citing LULAC I and 
Campos, found that “[t]wo minority groups . . . may be a single section 2 
minority if they can establish that they behave in a politically cohesive 
manner.”198  The claim was brought by Black and Hispanic plaintiffs who 
alleged that an at-large voting system “unlawfully dilute[ed] the [group’s] 
combined voting strength.”199  The claim ultimately failed because “the class 
offered little evidence that blacks and hispanics in [the district] worked 
together” or “ever voted together.”200 
 
 189. Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245 (“Of course, if one part of the group cannot be expected to 
vote with the other part, the combination is not cohesive.”). 
 190. See Campos, 840 F.2d at 1249–50 (“After making the initial Gingles’ factor 
determination, the district court turned to the [Senate report] factors to determine whether, 
under the totality of the circumstances, there was a § 2 voter dilution claim.”); see also Johnson 
v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1012 (1994). 
 191. See Campos, 840 F.2d at 1249. 
 192. 871 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 193. See id. at 540. 
 194. 876 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 195. Id. at 453 (referencing Overton to caution against reaching conclusions about “inter-
minority cohesion absent a diligent inquiry into the political dynamics of the particular 
community”). 
 196. 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 197. Id. at 864 (“Nevertheless, we have treated the issue as a question of fact, allowing 
aggregation of different minority groups where the evidence suggests that they are politically 
cohesive, and we need not revisit this question here.”). 
 198. Concerned Citizens of Hardee Cty. v. Hardee Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F.2d 524, 526 
(11th Cir. 1990) (first citing Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988); 
then citing LULAC I, 812 F.2d 1494, 1499–502 (5th Cir. 1987), reh’g granted, 818 F.2d 350 
(5th Cir. 1987), and vacated, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987)). 
 199. Id. at 525. 
 200. Id. at 527. 
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2.  The Sixth Circuit Dissent in Nixon v. Kent County 
Judge Keith’s dissent to the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Nixon provides a 
comprehensive analysis in support of permitting minority aggregation under 
the VRA.201  In Nixon, an en banc Sixth Circuit panel denied Black and 
Hispanic plaintiffs the right to bring a unified vote dilution claim under 
section 2.202  Judge Keith’s dissent, joined by four other judges,203 relied on 
(1) statutory language, (2) legislative history, and (3) commonly accepted 
practices to advocate for VRA protection of minority coalitions.204 
First, Judge Keith identified the ambiguity in Congress’s use of the phrase 
“class of citizens” in the VRA’s text.205  He rejected the majority’s argument 
that the VRA’s failure to address coalition groups meant that Congress did 
not intend to grant such groups section 2 protection.206  He stated instead 
that, because the VRA is ambiguous in its applicability to minority coalitions, 
the majority was required to follow the “mandates of statutory construction” 
by looking to legislative history.207 
Judge Keith then analyzed Congress’s purpose in passing and amending 
the VRA following the Supreme Court’s example in Chisom.208  Here, as 
with the issue presented in Chisom,209 neither the text nor the legislative 
history “limits Section 2 protection to cases involving only one historically 
disadvantaged ethnic group.”210  As a result, given the broadest-possible-
reading requirement established by Chisom,211 a narrow reading that omits 
coalition protection runs contrary to Congress’s purpose of broadening the 
VRA’s scope.212  Both the 1975 and 1982 congressional amendments 
explicitly intended to extend the VRA’s protections by, for example, 
inserting the broad phrase “protected class” into section 2.213  Taken together 
with the law’s plain language, Congress’s desire to expand the VRA’s reach 
supports recognition of aggregated minority claims.214 
 
 201. See Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1393–403 (6th Cir. 1996) (Keith, J., 
dissenting). 
 202. See id. at 1393 (majority opinion). 
 203. Id. at 1403–04 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
 204. Id. at 1393–97.  Judge Keith also argued, with the support of only two other dissenters, 
that prohibiting minority aggregation under the VRA segregates solely on the basis of race. 
Id. at 1399–400.  He contended that such a reading of the law serves no compelling state 
interest and is therefore constitutionally impermissible. Id. 
 205. Id. at 1394. 
 206. Id. at 1398. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See id. at 1398–99. 
 209. See id. at 1398; see also supra notes 117–21 and accompanying text. 
 210. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1398 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
 211. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 212. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1398 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
 213. See id. at 1398–99 (recognizing that, if Congress intended to omit section 2 protection 
for minority coalitions, it would have stated as much in the extensive legislative record 
accompanying the 1982 amendments). 
 214. See id. at 1399. 
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Finally, Judge Keith looked to accepted practices.215  He noted that every 
other court to address an aggregation claim has “assumed they are 
permissible where the Gingles prerequisites are satisfied.”216  He also relied 
on support from the U.S. attorney general—“the officer entrusted to enforce 
the Act.”217  The attorney general, in an amicus brief opposing certiorari in 
Campos, asserted that, “if the political reality is that Hispanics and blacks 
view themselves . . . as a single unit . . . then it is sensible to treat them as 
one group under the Voting Rights Act.”218  Since the VRA’s enactment, 
each attorney general had supported an expansive reading of the law.219  “In 
light of the extensive role the Attorney General played in drafting the [VRA] 
and explaining its operation to Congress,” Judge Keith argued that the 
attorney general’s interpretation “provides compelling evidence” of how 
Congress understood the law.220 
3.  Support in Scholarship 
A handful of scholars have advocated on behalf of VRA protection for 
minority coalitions.221  In addition to reinforcing arguments already asserted 
by the circuit courts,222 scholars have also developed new rationales to 
support aggregated claims.  Some argue that requiring a protected class to 
consist of just a single minority group furthers the discrimination that the 
VRA sought to eradicate.223  This practice, they argue, “further separates, 
classifies and labels minority groups” in a way that entrenches minority status 
rather than promotes cross-sectional unity.224  Regardless, they argue that 
racial or ethnic composition of the protected class misguides the analysis.225  
The ultimate inquiry of section 2 is whether or not a minority group has less 
opportunity to participate in the political process—this may be true of one or 
 
 215. See id. at 1396–97. 
 216. Id. at 1396 (looking specifically to Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit precedents). 
 217. Id. at 1397. 
 218. Id. at 1397 (quoting Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae at 
35–36, Nixon, 76 F.3d 1381 (No. 93-1456)). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. (“Thus, the Attorney General’s construction of the Act supports the finding that 
Section 2 permits minority coalition claims.”). 
 221. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 23, at 426; Strange, supra note 6, at 128; Michaloski, supra 
note 23, at 291 
 222. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 23, at 431 n.167 (supporting the argument in Judge Keith’s 
Nixon dissent that the phrase “class of citizens” does not explicitly reject minority 
aggregation); Michaloski, supra note 23, at 295 (accepting the “functional and holistic 
approach” adopted in Campos and the Nixon dissent). 
 223. See Michaloski, supra note 23, at 292–93 (noting that this practice “furthers overbroad 
stereotypes and prejudices about and against the minority groups instead of providing equality 
in the political process”). 
 224. Id. at 292; see also Ho, supra note 23, at 434 (“[A] rule against coalition districts 
would afford minority groups protection only when each group votes cohesively as an 
independent group, and would thereby disincentivize the formation of cross-racial coalitions 
that the VRA is supposed to encourage.”). 
 225. Michaloski, supra note 23, at 291. 
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multiple cohesive minority groups that have experienced similar barriers to 
voting.226 
Scholars have also attacked the arbitrariness of a single-minority 
requirement “given the increasingly complex ways in which Americans self-
identify by race and ethnicity.”227  If section 2 were to prohibit minority 
aggregation, a multiracial or multilingual Hispanic community may be 
unable to assert a claim.228  It would also bar a community of Asian 
Americans who speak different languages.229  Scholars note that this makes 
entirely uncertain the legal protections afforded to biracial or multiracial 
individuals.230  Ultimately, any claim that internal unity is stronger in a single 
minority group than it would be in a coalition group is unfounded.231 
Minority coalition supporters remind critics that aggregation would not 
allow misuse of the VRA for political gain because coalitions still must 
satisfy the Gingles factors.232  The VRA makes no assumptions about the 
cohesive political preferences or voting patterns of any minority group.233  
Rick Strange234 went further and developed a test to address the concerns 
that permitting coalition claims would dilute the VRA.235  This three-prong 
test serves as a precondition to applying the Gingles framework.236  First, 
Strange requires that the differing minority groups have similar 
socioeconomic backgrounds.237  Second, the distinct minority groups must 
have “similar attitudes” toward the challenged voting practice.238  And third, 
 
 226. Id. (“If two minority groups experience oppression at the hands of the majority, and 
they are able to establish the same burden of proof as one minority group might, then . . . 
[democracy] is best served by allowing them to form a coalition.”). 
 227. See Ho, supra note 23, at 432–33 (“Can there ever be members of a single group, 
given the inherent arbitrariness of our racial and ethnic categories?”); see also Michaloski, 
supra note 23, at 292. 
 228. See Ho, supra note 23, at 432. 
 229. See id.  “Asian American” is a class explicitly protected under the VRA. See supra 
note 65 and accompanying text. 
 230. See Ho, supra note 23, at 432; Michaloski, supra note 23, at 292 (“In fact, minority 
groups often have multiple subgroups as a result of differing internal cultures and histories.”). 
 231. See Ho, supra note 23, at 433 (noting that groups of “‘Blacks,’ ‘Hispanics’ and 
‘Asians’ . . . often consist of individuals with different linguistic, national origin, and cultural 
backgrounds”). 
 232. See Michaloski, supra note 23, at 294 (disputing the conclusion in Nixon that coalition 
suits would provide unfair political advantages). 
 233. See Ho, supra note 23, at 433 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 34 (1982)). 
 234. Justice Rick Strange was, until 2011, a justice of the Texas State Eleventh Court of 
Appeals.  See Bob Campbell, Strange Misses Texas Supreme Court Runoff, MIDLAND REP.-
TELEGRAM (Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.mrt.com/news/article/Strange-misses-Texas-
Supreme-Court-runoff-7479506.php [https://perma.cc/FQG8-96MS]. 
 235. See Strange, supra note 6, at 129. 
 236. Id.  Strange’s three-part test was inspired by a similar recommendation made to the 
Fifth Circuit in LULAC I. Id. at 95. 
 237. Id. at 129–31 (“If the groups can show that they suffer from similar handicaps, such 
as poor education, housing, and high unemployment, it is more reasonable to conclude that 
they collectively suffer from discrimination which has adversely affected their right to vote.”); 
see also Note, supra note 130, at 2639. 
 238. Strange, supra note 6, at 129, 131–37 (calling for a case-by-case determination of 
whether the attitudes of the distinct minority groups are similar, though stating that they need 
not be identical). 
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the minority groups must have consistently voted for the same candidates.239  
Satisfying this burden, Strange contends, “will lead to greater compliance 
with congressional intent since a court will be assured that it is faced with a 
cohesive political unit joined by a common disability of chronic bigotry.”240  
Failure to satisfy the test would weed out any “political alliance[s] having 
little or no connection to discrimination.”241 
B.  Assumed Validity of Minority Aggregation 
Prior to 2012, two circuits implicitly accepted the right of minorities to 
aggregate for a section 2 claim.  First, the Ninth Circuit in Romero v. City of 
Pomona,242 and again in Badillo v. City of Stockton,243 entertained a vote 
dilution claim by Blacks and Hispanics without questioning their right to 
aggregate.  The Second Circuit followed suit several years later in Bridgeport 
Coalition for Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport.244  However, in 
2012, the Second Circuit explicitly recognized the circuit split over coalition 
claims and accepted their validity pursuant to its precedent.245 
In Romero, Black and Hispanic voters alleged that an at-large voting 
system for the city council diluted their ability to elect preferred 
candidates.246  The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Central District of 
California’s findings that the minority coalition did not represent a majority 
of eligible voters in any hypothetical voting district.247  It did not matter that 
the coalition may have constituted a majority of the total population.248  As 
other courts have recognized, “a section 2 claim will fail unless the plaintiff 
can establish that the minority group constitutes an effective voting majority 
in a single-member district.”249  In Romero, the plaintiffs could not establish 
this.250  Though the analysis could have stopped there, given that all three 
Gingles preconditions are required, the court went on to find that the group 
was also not politically cohesive.251  While the claim was unsuccessful, the 
court did not address the fact that the plaintiffs comprised a coalition of 
multiple distinct minorities.  It simply assumed that Blacks and Hispanics 
could aggregate to bring a section 2 claim.252 
 
 239. Id. (noting that this showing would all but satisfy the first two Gingles factors). 
 240. Id. at 129. 
 241. Id. 
 242. 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 243. 956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 244. 26 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 245. See Pope v. County of Albany, 687 F.3d 565, 572 n.5 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 246. Romero, 883 F.2d at 1420. 
 247. See id. at 1425–26. 
 248. See id. 
 249. Id. at 1426 (emphasis added). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 1426–27 (“The district court’s finding was based in part on the 1985 city council 
primary elections, in which plaintiffs’ exit polls revealed that 60% of blacks voted against the 
Hispanic candidate . . . and in favor of white candidates.”). 
 252. See generally id. 
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Similarly, in Badillo, Blacks and Hispanics in California contested the 
adoption of an at-large voting system.253  The Ninth Circuit recognized that 
the contested voting system embodied “many electoral devices and practices 
that have been readily identified as common means of diminishing minority 
voting strength.”254  Regardless, the plaintiffs’ claim failed because there was 
no requisite showing that Blacks and Hispanics were politically cohesive, 
“either when combined or when considered separately.”255  It could not be 
determined that the district court was clearly erroneous in making this factual 
finding.256  Again, even though the claim was unsuccessful, the Ninth Circuit 
implicitly accepted the minority coalition’s right to allege a single section 2 
claim.257 
In 1994, the Second Circuit accepted review of a successful vote dilution 
claim brought by several activist groups on behalf of Black and Hispanic 
citizens.258  In Bridgeport, the plaintiffs alleged that the racial configurations 
of ten voting districts were adjusted in a way that diluted minority votes.259  
Addressing the first Gingles factor, the court found that Blacks and Hispanics 
constituted a substantial share of the area’s eligible voting population.260  
This distribution made it possible to create two more minority-controlled 
districts than had previously been recommended.261  The court then accepted 
“both testimonial and statistical evidence that African Americans and 
Hispanics . . . are politically cohesive” in a city plagued by “remarkably 
racially polarized” voting.262  Regarding the third Gingles factor, the court 
recognized ambiguity in the “mixed bag” of evidence regarding the presence 
of white bloc voting.263  It resolved this ambiguity in favor of the plaintiffs 
by citing undisputed evidence “that politically influential whites have 
worked to” elect white candidates over Black candidates.264  Without 
explicitly commenting on the applicability of section 2 to coalition claims, 
 
 253. See Badillo v. City of Stockton, 956 F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 254. Id. at 889–90 (including examples of electoral devices used to diminish minority 
voting strength, such as the system’s at-large component, a majority vote requirement, and a 
functional runoff election procedure). 
 255. Id. at 891. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 884. 
 258. See Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271, 272–
73 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 259. Id. at 272 (“The plan proposed . . . continued a division into ten districts but changed 
the configurations so that one district would be populated by a majority of black citizens, one 
would be composed of a majority of Latino citizens, two would contain a majority of black 
and Latino citizens combined, and the remaining six districts would consist of a majority of 
white voters.”). 
 260. See id. at 275. 
 261. See id. at 275–76. 
 262. Id. at 276.  This, of course, satisfies the second Gingles factor. See supra note 102 and 
accompanying text. 
 263. See Bridgeport Coal., 26 F.3d at 276. 
 264. Id.  The court also applied the “fourth factor” of Gingles, looking at the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the challenged voting practice. Id.  In concluding that the district 
court was not clearly erroneous, it recognized a “number of race-based controversies” 
surrounding the municipality. Id. at 277. 
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the court determined that the Gingles analysis “weigh[ed] substantially in 
favor of [a] finding of vote dilution.”265 
Almost two decades later, the Second Circuit changed its position on 
minority aggregation from assumed validity to explicit acceptance.  In Pope 
v. County of Albany,266 the court dedicated a single footnote to addressing 
the circuit split that had developed following the Sixth Circuit’s Nixon 
decision.267  It clearly identified that “the Supreme Court has expressly 
reserved decision on the issue” and has stated the theoretical requirements of 
a coalition group in Emison.268  The Second Circuit then went on to recognize 
that its own precedent, specifically Bridgeport, has accepted coalition 
claims.269  It relied on this in Pope to affirm the Northern District of New 
York’s finding that a minority coalition failed to satisfy the second and third 
Gingles factors.270 
C.  Explicit Rejection of Minority Aggregation 
Only one federal court of appeals has explicitly determined that minority 
coalition claims are not permissible under section 2 of the VRA.  In 1996, 
the Sixth Circuit became the first to deny a multiracial coalition access to 
section 2’s protections.271  In doing so, the court relied on the VRA’s text 
and legislative history to narrowly interpret the law’s applicability.272  On 
similar grounds, Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit delivered 
a striking dissent to the Campos court, rejecting minority coalition 
protections.273  Since that time, the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have 
all alluded to the minority aggregation issue.  While each has either directly 
or indirectly expressed concern, none has taken the step to affirmatively 
reject coalition claims.274  Scholars have also addressed the issue, arguing 
against a broad interpretation of section 2.275 
1.  The Sixth Circuit in Nixon v. Kent County 
In Nixon, the Sixth Circuit looked to (1) the VRA’s text, (2) other 
authorities, (3) expansive trends, and (4) policy considerations to address the 
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 266. 687 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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 268. Id.; see also supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text. 
 269. See Pope, 687 F.3d at 572 n.5. 
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 271. See generally Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 272. See id. at 1386–92. 
 273. See generally Campos v. City of Baytown, 849 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
 274. See, e.g., Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 431 (4th Cir. 2004); Metts v. Murphy, 347 
F.3d 346, 359 (1st Cir. 2003), vacated on reh’g en banc, 363 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004); Frank v. 
Forest County, 336 F.3d 570, 575 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 275. See infra Part II.C.3. 
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minority aggregation issue.276  Looking first to the text, Judge Richard F. 
Suhrheinrich relied on the complete lack of reference to coalition groups in 
the “clear, unambiguous language” of section 2.277  He reasoned that, if 
Congress intended to extend protection to coalition groups, it would have 
invoked protected “classes of citizens” instead of a protected “class of 
citizens” identified under the Act.278  Given that the language of section 2 
“reveals no word or phrase which reasonably supports combining separately 
protected minorities,” statutory construction requires that this interpretation 
be conclusive.279  Second, the court considered other authorities, primarily 
legislative history and other circuit decisions.280  Since the VRA’s plain 
meaning is clear, “resort to the legislative history is unnecessary and 
improper.”281  The court then identified and criticized the other circuits on 
their application of statutory interpretation, “which none of the 
aforementioned courts acknowledged, let alone applied.”282  Judge 
Suhrheinrich specifically rejected the “incomplete [and] incorrect analysis” 
of the Campos court.283 
Third, the court addressed the plaintiffs’ argument that the VRA’s “broad 
remedial purposes” required an expansive interpretation of the law.284  The 
Sixth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs’ reliance on this concept, derived 
from Chisom, was misplaced.285  In Chisom, the Supreme Court extended the 
VRA, following the 1982 amendments, to judicial elections because judicial 
elections were specifically covered in prior versions of the Act.286  In Nixon, 
by contrast, “it [was] undisputed that the [VRA] has never permitted coalition 
suits by its terms.”287  The Sixth Circuit also rejected an argument that the 
purposes of the 1975 and 1982 VRA amendments condoned “a broad and 
boundless ‘trend’ to expand the Act to protect” minority coalitions.288  
Finally, Judge Suhrheinrich considered four policy considerations to reject 
minority aggregation under the VRA.289  First, he stated that Congress 
identified a specific list of minorities protected under the law, which did not 
include minority coalitions, based on congressional findings of 
 
 276. See Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1386–92.  In Nixon, Blacks and Hispanics brought a class action 
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 278. Id. at 1386–87. 
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 282. Id. at 1388. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 1389. 
 285. Id.; see also supra notes 208–14 and accompanying text. 
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discrimination.290  Second, the mechanics of allowing minority aggregation 
would create an unsolvable “puzzle” for state legislatures that, “in good faith, 
seek to draw district lines according to the [VRA’s] nebulous 
requirements.”291  Third, Judge Suhrheinrich contended that permitting 
coalition claims would require eliminating the first Gingles factor.292  
Finally,  permitting minority aggregation would run contrary to the law’s 
purpose by providing “minority groups with a political advantage not . . . 
authorized by the constitutional and statutory underpinnings of [the 
VRA].”293 
2.  Rejection and Ambiguity in the Other Circuits 
Judge Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit consistently rejected the concept 
of minority aggregation, delivering dissenting opinions in both LULAC I and 
on a denial for rehearing in Campos.294  In his Campos dissent, he 
characterized the majority’s interpretation of such a “uniquely important 
statute” as “disturbing.”295  Where the majority determined that nothing in 
the VRA prohibited minority coalitions, Judge Higginbotham noted that the 
correct question is whether “Congress intended to protect those 
coalitions.”296  He stated that no such intent can be deduced.297  Congress’s 
decision to extend VRA protection to language minorities does not mean that 
Congress intended to extend protection to a combination of different 
individually protected groups.298  Judge Higginbotham went further to 
challenge the notion “that a group composed of [different minorities] is itself 
a protected minority.”299  Instead, such groups merely constitute political 
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(Higginbotham, J., dissenting); LULAC I, 812 F.2d 1494, 1503 (5th Cir. 1987) (Higginbotham, 
J., dissenting), reh’g granted, 818 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1987), and vacated, 829 F.2d 546 (5th 
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 295. Campos, 849 F.2d at 944 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
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 297. See id. 
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 299. See id. 
2722 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
alliances with shared agendas.300  Protecting political alliances “stretch[es] 
the concept of cohesiveness” and dilutes its effectiveness as a measure of 
relation between discrimination and voting practices.301  At the very least, he 
scolded the majority for not better investigating political cohesion, asking 
whether each minority group in the coalition was individually cohesive.302 
Unlike the circuits addressed thus far, the First Circuit has not yet rendered 
a clear opinion on the minority aggregation question.303  Originally, the First 
Circuit fell into the category of tacit acceptance by permitting review of a 
coalition group claim, without raising issue with the fact that the plaintiffs 
came from three distinct minority groups.304  This opinion, however, was 
released several months before the Supreme Court issued its Gingles 
decision.305  In 2003, the First Circuit again tacitly made reference to the idea 
of minority aggregation but ultimately indicated an alternative 
interpretation.306  In reference to the third Gingles factor, the First Circuit 
found that “[w]hile the ‘protected class’ being discriminated against must be 
constituted of a particular ‘race or color,’” the same was not required of the 
majority voting bloc.307  In that case, however, the court was not facing a 
minority aggregation claim.  While this leaves unresolved the First Circuit’s 
formal stance on coalitions, the court, post-Gingles, is likely to read section 
2 narrowly and require claims be brought by single-minority groups. 
Similarly, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have, without deciding, 
expressed concerns about the implications of minority coalitions.  In Hall v. 
Virginia,308 the Fourth Circuit reviewed a claim brought by Black voters 
alleging vote dilution.309  To satisfy the first Gingles factor, the plaintiffs 
asserted that “blacks were sufficiently numerous to combine with white 
voters” to elect their preferred candidates.310  While this presents a crossover 
claim,311 the court’s analysis more broadly addressed general multiracial 
coalition claims.312  Citing both Nixon and Judge Higginbotham’s Campos 
dissent, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that “multiracial coalitions would 
transform the [VRA]” from a source of minority protection to an advantage 
for political coalitions.313  Ultimately, a redistricting plan that diminishes the 
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ability of a minority group “to form a political coalition with other racial or 
ethnic groups, does not result in vote dilution ‘on account of race’ in violation 
of Section 2.”314  The Seventh Circuit, in Frank v. Forest County,315 
addressed an Indian tribe’s claim of vote dilution against a single-member 
municipal voting district scheme.316  The claim relied on a multiracial group 
consisting of tribe members and Blacks to satisfy Gingles’s first 
requirement.317  In addressing the coalition argument, Judge Richard A. 
Posner identified the circuit split and the Supreme Court’s decision to reserve 
judgment.318  Without explicitly rejecting the viability of minority 
aggregation, Judge Posner briefly acknowledged the “problematic character” 
of such claims.319  He then went on to reject the claim for lack of evidence 
of mutual interest in municipal county governance between the two 
groups.320 
3.  Criticism in Scholarship 
Many scholars have argued that the VRA should not allow protection for 
minority coalition groups.  Critics have echoed the reservations of courts, 
arguing that a narrow interpretation of section 2’s text does not support 
minority aggregation.321  Additionally, it is argued that legislative history 
suggests Congress passed the VRA to protect specific minority groups based 
on empirical evidence of past voting discrimination.322  The logic asserted is 
that empirical evidence of voting discrimination against two minority groups, 
individually, cannot infer voting discrimination between a combination of 
those two groups.323  Had Congress sought to remedy the coalition issue, it 
would have done so explicitly when it revisited the VRA for amendment in 
2006.324  Absent that clarification, “the courts should not read into a statute 
what is not there.”325 
Another theory posed that broad protection under the VRA is unnecessary 
when minorities may otherwise seek relief through the Constitution.326  
Where section 2 would not apply, minority coalitions may still allege claims 
of vote dilution under the Equal Protection Clause and Fifteenth 
Amendment.327  Unlike section 2 claims, constitutional claims would, of 
course, require the coalition to prove an intent to discriminate.328  This, it is 
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argued, helps mitigate the fear that political coalitions may rely on section 2 
to gain an unfair advantage in the political process.329  Courts may then 
dismiss claims against so-called good faith jurisdictions that would otherwise 
face the consequences of section 2’s strict liability results test.330  This 
constitutional avenue allows courts to avoid complex statutory interpretation 
questions that implicate principles of federalism.331 
Several more critics have attempted to “read the tea leaves” and predict 
how the Supreme Court is likely to address minority coalition claims.332  The 
consensus is that the Supreme Court’s rejection of crossover claims in 
Strickland strongly suggests that the Court will reject aggregation between 
different minority groups as well.333  It is argued that the same issue of 
protecting political alliances exists, regardless of whether aggregation is with 
other minorities or whites.334  The Strickland Court, quoting De Grandy, 
highlighted that “[m]inority voters are not immune from the obligation to 
pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground.”335  Scholars look to 
the Court’s argument that the VRA is not meant to give minorities “the most 
potential, or the best potential, to elect a candidate by attracting crossover 
voters.”336  Some scholars contend that this applies equally to the attraction 
of coalition voters.337  It is argued that Strickland is instructive of the Court’s 
future approach to minority aggregation because it “framed the issue as 
whether a minority group that constitutes less than fifty percent can meet the 
first Gingles precondition.”338  The Court’s answer was ultimately no.339 
III.  MINORITY GROUPS CAN AGGREGATE UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE VRA 
There is no indication that section 2 minority coalition claims are going 
away.340  As the diversity of the American voting population continues to 
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grow, determining the VRA’s correct interpretation becomes increasingly 
important.  This Part argues that the current circuit split should be resolved 
in favor of permitting minority coalitions access to section 2 protections.  
This resolution is consistent with the conclusions of the Second, Fifth, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits and remains faithful to the Supreme Court’s principles 
of statutory interpretation.  While such a conclusion may be sustained on the 
VRA’s text alone, it is also supported by the intent of Congress demonstrated 
through its legislative history.  In addition, despite the qualms of critics, the 
VRA is the appropriate avenue of relief for minority coalitions.  The VRA 
offers broad remedial protection that is inadequately safeguarded by the 
Constitution alone.  Unlike crossover claims, acceptance of minority 
aggregation does not render the Gingles framework unworkable.  In fact, 
strict adherence to the Gingles framework polices against abuse of the VRA’s 
protections. 
A.  Principles of Statutory Interpretation Support Coalition Protection 
The Supreme Court has historically engaged in a process of practical 
reasoning, relying on a hierarchy of sources to interpret statutes.341  This 
analysis begins with a statute’s text, looking to the “specific words of the 
statutory provision being interpreted.”342  Absent an explicit statutory 
definition, the challenged words are typically given their “ordinary 
meaning.”343  Ordinary meaning is best understood as “reliance on a common 
sense understanding of textual words or phrases, without reference to 
additional aids.”344  Ordinary meaning must be considered in both the 
narrower context of the specific provision in which it is placed and the 
broader context of the statute as a whole.345  It must not be interpreted in 
isolation.346  Ordinary meaning and textual interpretation must also abide by 
canons (or rules) of statutory construction.  For example, adoption of a 
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particular interpretation must be rejected if enforcement of that interpretation 
would produce an absurd result.347  The canon against surplusage dictates 
that the language of a statute should not be interpreted in a way that “renders 
superfluous another portion of the same law.”348  Additionally, the last 
antecedent rule presumes that “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should 
ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately 
follows.”349 
If a clear textual meaning is deduced, this may justify an end to the analysis 
or merely serve as a presumption that the textual meaning is correct.350  If 
the analysis continues, the Court then typically looks to historical 
considerations where legislative history is the most authoritative source.351  
If Congress’s intent clearly supports the textual interpretation, that 
interpretation is likely decisive.352  Absent clarity at that stage, the Court may 
then look to more dynamic factors such as enforcement methods, current 
values of fairness, and constitutional principles.353 
Applying this framework to the VRA requires prudent courts to identify 
that the statute’s ordinary meaning provides minority coalitions protection 
under section 2.  Any other interpretation is disingenuous to the text of 
section 2, contradicts legislative intent, and is functionally unworkable. 
1.  What Is a “Class” of Citizens? 
Section 2 of the VRA safeguards “members of a class of citizens protected 
by subsection (a)” of the same provision.354  Subsection (a), of course, 
identifies racial and language minorities as the beneficiaries of the VRA.355  
Critics of minority aggregation argue that, had Congress intended to protect 
coalition groups, it would have written “classes of citizens” into the statute 
instead of a “class of citizens.”356  This criticism overstates the role of the 
word “class” in section 2.  Invoking the presumptive last antecedent rule 
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requires courts to apply the limiting phrase “protected by subsection (a)” only 
to the noun directly proceeding it, which is “citizens.”357  As a result, it is not 
the singular class that must be composed of a racial or language minority 
protected under subsection (a) but rather each citizen that makes up the class.  
So long as one class is asserting a claim, and each citizen in that class is a 
protected racial or language minority, the statutory requirements are met.  
Were a court to mandate that all citizens from the class have the same 
minority status, it would be wrongfully reading into the statute what is not 
there.358 
While the last antecedent rule is rebuttable,359 there is no structural or 
contextual evidence in the “clear, unambiguous language”360 of section 2 
calling for deviation from the rule.  In fact, there is substantial evidence to 
the contrary.  Proper textual interpretation requires considering the disputed 
language in the context of the entire provision.361  Section 2 in its entirety 
addresses and is concerned with “citizens” and “members” of the electorate 
who may be impacted by vote dilution, not the class itself.362  Subsection (a) 
makes no reference to “class” at all.363  Any mention of a “protected class” 
otherwise is actually referencing “members” of a protected class, with 
individual members being the primary subjects.364 
Courts may also use the rule against surplusage to reach the same 
conclusion.365  Were the Supreme Court to accept the Nixon court’s 
interpretation, it would render superfluous any reference to “members” or 
“citizens” in section 2.366  Had Congress intended the narrower Nixon 
interpretation, it would have simply identified a “class protected by 
subsection (a).”  Had Congress intended the Nixon interpretation while still 
making clear that section 2 is available to individual citizens, it could have 
identified “members of a class protected by subsection (a)” or even “citizens 
of a class protected by subsection (a).”  It chose none of these.  Thus, there 
is no basis to render portions of the broader provision meaningless in order 
to achieve a narrower interpretation that is faithful to language Congress 
chose not to enact. 
Even if a court were to find that the limiting phrase applies to the word 
“class,” the word’s ordinary meaning is not so restrictive as to reject the 
possibility of a multiminority class.  Merriam-Webster defines “class” as “a 
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group sharing the same economic or social status.”367  It has already been 
determined that different distinct minority groups may, as a result of their 
diversity, suffer similar or the same social and economic consequences.368  
This conclusion is most poignant in the cases of citizens who identify as both 
racial and language minorities.  In these cases, rejection of coalition claims, 
and thus rejection of the text’s ordinary meaning, would produce absurd 
results.  Such an interpretation of the law would require those individuals to 
assume multiple social identities and prioritize one of those identities in 
pursuit of securing voting rights.  This not only further polarizes minority 
groups but also becomes increasingly unworkable as diversity in America 
grows more complex.369 
Additionally, this interpretation blatantly contradicts the VRA given that 
certain already-protected groups are capable of being coalition groups.  
“Asian American,” for example, is a distinct grouping protected under the 
VRA that could theoretically be composed of Chinese Americans, Japanese 
Americans, and Indian Americans who speak different languages.370  
Similarly, “American Indians,” or Native Americans, are protected under 
section 2371—another group capable of being multilingual in a particular 
voting district.372  Despite their coalitional nature, the VRA defines these 
groups as permissible “classes.”373 
While the Campos court ultimately misunderstood the question that must 
be asked regarding the text of section 2, it reached the correct conclusion.  It 
is unimportant that nothing in the law’s text prohibits minority coalitions.374  
What matters, instead, is whether the ordinary meaning of “members of a 
class of citizens protected by subsection (a),” understood in the context of 
section 2 and the VRA as a whole, permits citizens with different minority 
statuses to form a single class under section 2.  The statutory text and 
applicable canons of construction suggest the answer is yes.  At a minimum, 
the answer is maybe and an examination of the VRA’s legislative history is 
required.375 
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2.  Congress Intended for Broad Protection 
The VRA’s legislative history “puts icing on a cake already frosted” by 
supporting Congress’s intent for section 2 to have broad remedial powers.376  
Judge Keith’s dissent in Nixon correctly identified that nothing in the 
legislative history limits section 2’s protection to single-minority claims.377  
On the contrary, Congress has instead repeatedly broadened the power of 
section 2.378  The Nixon majority correctly noted that this fact does not permit 
a “boundless” expansion of the law.379  However, Congress’s repeated 
expansion of section 2 is instructive when addressing the minority coalition 
question, which is, at least on its face, answered affirmatively by the VRA’s 
text. 
By expanding the VRA in 1975, Congress recognized that language 
minorities have long been subject to forms of discrimination like those to 
which racial minorities have been subject.380  The Senate Judiciary 
Committee found, for example, that discrimination against Hispanics was 
evident in “almost every facet of life,” paralleling the barriers faced by 
Blacks.381  Going further, the Senate explicitly relied on precedent involving 
a minority coalition claim between Hispanics and Blacks.382  It specifically 
observed how at-large voting schemes in Texas denied both minority groups 
access to electoral representation.383  At the very least, this indicates that 
Congress was contemplating minority aggregation when it rewrote section 2. 
Even in its 1982 adoption of the “results test,” Congress spoke of the rights 
of racial and language minorities in tandem.384  The results test entitles 
plaintiffs to relief if, under a totality of the circumstances, vote dilution is 
effectuated as a result of minority status.385  Absent an explicit omission by 
Congress, a coalition group bringing the claim should merely be one 
circumstance considered in the totality.  It is most striking that Congress 
derived its results test from the Supreme Court’s analysis in the same 
constitutional coalition case that it relied on in the 1975 amendments.386  This 
indicates Congress’s awareness, and likely acceptance, of the right of 
minorities to aggregate. 
It is evident that, on several occasions, Congress embraced and relied on 
the features of minority aggregation in its formulation of the modern version 
of section 2.  As a result, for those who care about it, the VRA’s legislative 
history supports congressional intent to award protection to minority 
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coalitions.387  Given that legislative history conforms with the textual 
interpretation forwarded by this Note, such an interpretation should be 
decisive absent compelling evidence to the contrary.388 
B.  Section 2 of the VRA Is the Proper Avenue of Relief for Minority 
Coalitions 
Despite support found in the text and legislative history of section 2, critics 
have continuously asserted that the VRA is not a proper avenue of relief for 
minority coalitions.389  These criticisms are misguided.  This Note identifies 
and categorically rejects three prominent arguments offered in opposition to 
the idea that section 2 may properly function as a remedy for a multiminority 
class.  First, the Constitution does not serve as an adequate alternative for 
minority coalitions seeking redemption of their voting powers.390  Second, 
permitting coalition claims would not render the well-established Gingles 
framework unworkable.391  Third, adherence to the Gingles test sufficiently 
prevents groups from using the VRA for unfair political advantage.392 
1.  The VRA Provides Broader Protection Than the Constitution 
Broad protection under section 2 is not unnecessary simply because 
minority coalitions may otherwise seek remedy under the Fourteenth or 
Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.393  Support for a constitutional 
alternative is premised on the idea that the burden of proof required for such 
claims serves as a check on coalitions seeking unfair political advantage.394  
This logic is misguided for two reasons.  First, Congress has already 
explicitly determined that section 2 is meant to confer protections beyond 
those explicitly embedded in the Constitution and that the burden to show 
discriminatory intent is inappropriate for vote dilution claims.  Second, the 
existing framework for analyzing vote dilution claims properly polices 
against abuse. 
As an initial matter, Congress has already clarified that intent is immaterial 
in identifying a section 2 claim.395  The justifications for rejecting intent still 
apply when minorities choose to aggregate.  Intent standards continue to ask 
 
 387. At the very least, the legislative history does not contradict the textual interpretation 
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the wrong question.396  If the challenged voting practice “operates today to 
exclude Blacks [and] Hispanics from a fair chance to participate,” past or 
present motives are still not relevant.397  Regardless of whether a class is 
composed of one or more minorities, intent still requires an unnecessarily 
divisive charge of racism against the entity responsible for the voting 
system.398  Third, intent places an “inordinately difficult burden” on minority 
coalitions, especially when satisfying the burdens derived from Gingles is 
already more challenging for coalitions.399  These principles clarify why 
constitutional avenues are not only too restrictive to carry vote dilution 
claims but also distort the underlying principles of such claims. 
The imposition of an intent requirement may have had more bite if the 
VRA were merely a codification of the Constitution.  However, the VRA is 
no longer coextensive with the Fifteenth Amendment.400  Instead, it is 
broader and prohibits what may otherwise be constitutionally permissible.401  
This interpretation is reflected in Chisom, in which the Supreme Court 
recognized that section 2 protects voting rights where the Constitution fails 
to do so.402  It would thus be counterintuitive to reject coalition claims under 
the VRA on the premise that the Constitution serves as an alternative source 
of remedy.403  While interpreting section 2 to have “the broadest possible 
scope” of protection should not equate to “boundless” protection,404 it at the 
very least should include claims that are contemplated by narrower 
constitutional provisions.  It would otherwise be unfeasible to recognize 
section 2 as a legitimate expansion of the Fifteenth Amendment,405 while 
simultaneously barring under section 2 what is explicitly permissible under 
the Fifteenth Amendment. 
2.  Coalition Claims Are Not Unworkable Under the Gingles Framework 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of crossover claims is neither a predictor 
nor a justification for rejecting coalition claims.406  Both have practical and 
legal differences that make them incomparable in their applicability to 
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section 2.  While both are premised on the idea that a single minority group 
cannot alone constitute a majority population, crossover claims rely on the 
white majority.407  The Court rejected this framework because section 2 
protects minorities, who have less opportunity than members of the white 
majority to participate in the political process.408  Permitting crossover 
claims would impose by law the majority-minority cooperation that the VRA 
was passed to encourage.409  Permitting coalition claims would simply 
impose by law the protection already promised to minorities who are unfairly 
represented in the voting system.  In addition, it functionally contradicts 
section 2’s purpose to grant protection to a group that, in part, consists of the 
very majority population that section 2 was enacted to protect against.  
Simply stated, white voters are not a group protected by section 2.  Permitting 
coalition claims does not implicate this problematic contradiction because 
each member of the coalition is a minority protected under the VRA. 
Further, acceptance of crossover claims would force the Supreme Court to 
abandon its long-relied-upon Gingles test as the two are not reconcilable.410  
Coalition claims, by contrast, are workable under the Gingles framework.  
The Court has interpreted the first Gingles factor as asking whether the 
minority group constitutes the majority of a theoretical voting district.411  
This means that the protected minority group is a populous majority in 
relation to some nonprotected population responsible for diluting the 
minority’s vote.  Crossover claims confuse this criterion because crossover 
groups intermingle the minority population with the nonprotected 
population.  Coalition groups avoid this confusion because each member of 
the coalition is protected under the VRA.  Regarding crossover claims and 
the third Gingles factor, the Court failed to understand how white bloc voting 
defeated minority candidates when white voters were “crossing over” to elect 
minority candidates.412  Again, this issue is resolved in the coalition context 
because the coalition is not relying on members of the white voting bloc 
responsible for its failure. 
3.  The Gingles Framework Prevents Minority Coalitions from Abusing the 
VRA 
Courts and scholars alike have been adamant that granting protection to 
minority coalitions will provide them a political advantage not intended by 
the VRA.413  This position stems from the misguided assertion that a 
coalition of multiple minorities does not constitute a single protected 
minority group but rather an alliance premised on mutual political goals.414  
Judge Keith, in his Nixon dissent, correctly identified that it simply makes 
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sense to consider multiple minorities as one group if that is the political 
reality.415  It should not matter that the two minority groups have variations 
in the history of their discrimination because the “prejudice of the majority 
is not narrowly focused.”416  In the VRA context, it should only matter that 
each protected minority group is equally subject to vote dilution under the 
circumstances contemplated by Gingles.  The presence of mutual political 
goals among members of a coalition group does not negate the reality that 
vote dilution is taking place.  Mutual political interests are present in any 
group seeking to elect a particular candidate, including in the single-minority 
groups currently awarded protection under section 2. 
Regardless, strict adherence to the Gingles framework otherwise prevents 
ill-intended groups from pursuing political agendas under the guise of vote 
dilution.  While Strange recommended that additional preconditions were 
needed to fully combat this danger,417 such a framework is redundant and 
would render it nearly impossible to successfully sustain an already 
challenging claim of vote dilution.418  The sufficiency of the Gingles test can 
be quantified by the fact that, of the ten circuit court cases where minority 
aggregation was explicitly or implicitly accepted, only three were successful 
for the coalition plaintiffs.419 
The Fifth Circuit’s approach is the closest to properly assessing minority 
aggregation claims under the Gingles framework.  Regarding the first factor, 
the coalition group’s voting population must constitute the majority of a 
hypothetical single-member voting district.420  A majority, as it is applied to 
single-minority groups, must mean more than 50 percent of the hypothetical 
district’s voting population. 
Like the Fifth Circuit’s approach in Campos,421 but unlike its approach in 
LULAC I,422 the second political cohesiveness factor should be assessed 
against the coalition group as a whole, rather than against each individual 
minority group and the whole coalition group.  Requiring a showing of 
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political cohesion at both stages places an “impossible”423 burden on the 
coalition.  It also fails to realize that a coalition group and single-minority 
group are functionally the same if political cohesion across the group is 
established.424  Further, political cohesion must be quantified by a concrete 
metric, such as the statistical data of past voting patterns used in Gingles and 
Campos.425 
The third Gingles factor is also crucial in drawing a distinction between 
racially polarized voting and attempted abuse of section 2.  The presence of 
a majority white voting bloc, like political cohesion, must persist over 
time.426  The Supreme Court recognized how particularly important political 
cohesion was in coalition claims;427 the same is true of white bloc voting.428  
A consistent pattern of both factors will allow courts to clearly recognize 
when systematic racially polarized voting has prevented a minority coalition 
from electing its candidate of choice.  The absence of this pattern may 
indicate that either no dilution is occurring or that the coalition is asserting 
its claim for improper purposes.  In ambiguity, courts may of course still look 
to the totality of the remaining circumstances to reach their conclusions. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 2 of the VRA sought to do what the Fifteenth Amendment alone 
could not:  protect minority populations from any voting system that has the 
effect of diluting their votes.  As the crown jewel of the civil rights 
movement, the VRA was intended to provide minorities with the broadest 
scope of protection possible.  Whether those protections extend to minority 
coalitions is a question that “cries out for clarification.”429  Denying minority 
coalitions protection under section 2 would violate the statute’s text, ignore 
Congress’s intent in passing it, and disappoint a class of citizens already too 
familiar with discriminatory, unconstitutional barriers to voting.  As the 2020 
Census results come in and a wave of redistricting approaches, minority 
groups in the most diverse corners of the United States have no guarantee 
that their voting rights will be protected.  The Supreme Court must address 
this question and provide clarity to courts and state legislatures in their 
interpretation of the VRA.  Ultimately, protecting minority coalitions is 
required to prevent an impending constitutional crisis at the polls. 
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